top of page

What Type Of Knowledge?: The Fidiest Position In Psychoanalytic Praxis.

The Letter, Issue 9, Spring 1997, Pages 102 - 116


Stephen J. Costello.


'I am not one of those who philosophise'. The less', Lacan continues, 'one wants to do philosophy, the more of it one does'.[1] I don't particularly want to philosophise either but as both Aristotle and Lacan have confirmed, in order to want not to philosophise, one must philosophise. What I have to say locates itself within theological and philosophical discourses as much as within Lacanian psychoanalytic praxis.

Today, I would like to confine myself to exploring the relationship between fideism and psychoanalysis or, to put it more specifically, the fideist position and analytic praxis, a connection tentatively adumbrated for us by Lacan in week 19 of the seminar entitled Crucial Problems for Psychoanalysis, which we are here considering.[2] To this end, I shall cover three topics: (1) a succinct historical and hermeneutical survey of fideism in the Western intellectual tradition; (2) a brief exposition of Pascal's and Kierkegaard's philosophical psychology of religion, as two examples of such a fideist position and; (3) to conclude by connecting the fideist position to the Lacanian clinic and to the sujet suppose savoir.

Want to read more?

Subscribe to to keep reading this exclusive post.

Related Posts

See All

Issue 9: Editorial

It will come as no surprise to our regular readership that this third and final issue of volume III of THE LETTER is given over to the...


Couldn’t Load Comments
It looks like there was a technical problem. Try reconnecting or refreshing the page.
bottom of page