The Letter, Issue 36, Spring 2006, Pages 1 - 19
LACAN'S VIATOR AND THE TIME TRAVELLER'S WIFE
When I was asked two months ago for a title for this paper I was still reading what is called an international best-seller that I had begun earlier in the summer. The Time Traveller's Wife is not going to win a Pulitzer Prize or a Mann Booker award but it does chime in uncannily with Lacan's discussion of the fundamental phantasy that 'supports all of those who want to be non-dupes in structure: namely, that their life is only a journey. Life is that of the viator (the pilgrim, the traveller). 'That they live in this lower world as strangers in a foreign land'.
In psychological terms this journey means that life begins with birth and passes through various stages until death - think of Erik Erikson's 'Eight Ages of Man'. This notion of life as a journey that is determined by something called development is, Lacan argues, a radical error and ends up by negating everything that Freud's discovery of the unconscious has revealed to us.
This is his opening salvo and already one to make us all query our own presuppositions about the stage of life we - and those who come to talk to us - are at!
Clare and Henry
I am not going to spend too much time on the novel but since it is in my title let me say that it illustrates in a charming way Lacan's contention that time is not linear, and echoes some of his essential themes in this seminar on the importance of the Imaginary - which is given a renewed emphasis here after spending decades in the background - and the contingent nature of human love.
To give a sense of the book I cannot do better than cite the publisher's summary:
This is the extraordinary love story of Clare and Henry who met when Clare was six and Henry was thirty-six, and were married when Clare was twenty-two and Henry thirty. Impossible but true, because Henry suffers from a rare condition where his genetic clock periodically resets and he finds himself pulled suddenly into his past or future. In the face of this force they can neither prevent nor control, Henry and Clare's struggle to lead normal lives is both intensely moving and entirely unforgettable.
If the author Audrey Niffenneger had been more exposed to Lacanian analysis instead of that of the city - Chicago - in which she works as a visual artist and university professor, she might have realised that Henry's condition is not all that rare and that as Lacan puts it in this seminar we all spend our lives being pulled hither and thither by the real, imaginary and symbolic forces that govern our lives. Whether in dreams or in what Lacan mockingly calls 'waking life' our patients often suddenly relive a particular moment of their past as if it were contemporary.
The patient we saw here at the Case Conference on Wednesday morning and who was presented as a psychotic also revealed that he was constantly living through all the triumphs and slights of a sixty-five year- old life whose high point was that he had boxed for Ireland. We hear the same thing from our patients in every session. They return traumatised and sometimes mortally wounded - like Henry - from experiences that remains as relevant as the so-called present and have never really become part of the past as the mythology of developmental psychology claims they should have done.
The presence of the past
But this past/present dilemma can be better glimpsed in the light of: 'What Freud indicates to us with the emergence of the unconscious. That at whatever point one is at of this so-called journey, the structure of desire never lets go and from beginning to end we remain completely determined by it.'
Now this is a hard doctrine and whenever I meet that great Heideggerean and Lacanian, William J. Richardson, he regularly asks: 'Where is there room for freedom and choice in Freud and Lacan's view of human life?' A question you will note that is repeated again and again! And to which I have no adequate answer.
Someone asked recently what I was going to do when I had finished translating all of Lacan's seminars. My answer was that I am going to try to understand them. Because Lacan's teaching, like that of all great teachers is fiendishly difficult and, if I may take an example that this year's MSc students are familiar with, the first serious article on the 1970 formulae of sexuation has only recently been published - by Guy le Gaufey who has done much for psychoanalysis in Ireland. So that making the seminars available in English is very much a first step and certainly does not allow one to answer all the questions that remain hanging in them.
The 'seminar' as a happening
These are all preliminaries and it is time for me to set out my stall and to indicate what I feel I can tell you about this seminar of 1973-74. I attended it with some seven or eight hundred others from all over France and indeed Europe in the Law Faculty of the Sorbonne and I doubt if there were ten people in that lecture theatre who understood what Lacan was talking about. Our guest speaker today, Charles Melman, was probably one of them. But now after all these years I begin to see why so little was understood. Lacan was not trying to remedy our ignorance, our lack of knowledge, as a good university teacher sets out to do. For him we already have knowledge, the unconscious knowledge that determines everything we do. And his teaching had its effect not by what he said but by the fact that his saying of it was a happening, an event that reached into the unconscious of his listeners.
So then, what analytic discourse responds to is the fact that your symptomatic thoughts and actions, far from being conditioned by ignorance, are always determined by something which is already a knowledge, and that we call the unconscious:
What you do, knows, knows what you are, knows you. What you do not sufficiently sense is the degree to which this statement is new. No one has ever dared to pronounce this verdict that I am pointing out to you here: the response of the unconscious, is that it implies, that it implies no-pardon (le sans-pardon), even in attenuating circumstances. What you do is knowledge, completely determined. Which is why, which is why the fact that it is determined by an articulation supported by the preceding generation in no way excuses you, since this only makes the saying, the saying of this knowledge, more hardened knowledge, as I might say. At the limit, a knowledge that was always there.
Now if Lacan is not trying to convey knowledge but is directing his 'saying' at the unconscious, this leaves problematic any attempt of mine to tell you what is at stake in this seminar. However, to articulate my own understanding of it I have boiled it down and summarised and cut it and find I am left with five headings that appear to me at this stage to be essential to resume what he is setting out: 'Dupes and non-dupes'; 'Saying versus what is said'; 'The unconscious and the psychoanalyst'; 'Love as contingent'; and finally 'Sexed identity and non-relationship'.
I will say a little about each of these if time permits but let me use the first heading to give my basic understanding of what Lacan is teaching this year.
Dupes and non-dupes
Speaking beings can be divided into dupes and non-dupes. The conned and those who don't want to be conned.
The dupes: Against all commonsense the dupes are the good guys. They are the ones who accept the knowledge of the unconscious as accessed by dreams, jokes and the psychopathology of everyday life but above all they buy into love, into its irrationality and its contingency and this helps them to rediscover something that has been foreclosed from our modern world in favour of mastery and the iron law of economics.
The dupes reject the accepted laws of history - whether they are based on divine providence or on Marxist historical materialism - with their assumption that a harmonic relationship can eventually be reached between mankind and the world. This is based on the axiom that there is a knowledge in the real which guides events - such as those determined by the laws of gravity - according to God's plan. On the contrary, says Lacan, what Freud put forward derives from the discovery of a defect in being, a disharmony between thought and the world which was first highlighted by psychoanalysis in the observation that the sexual relationship between speaking beings always shows itself to be discordant.
Unconscious knowledge, the one Freud supposes, is distinguished from this knowledge in the Real in such a way, that whatever of it there is, even science manages to make this knowledge providential, namely, something, a subject, guarantees as harmonic. What Freud puts forward - but I note in passing that it is not all - is that it is not providential, that it is dramatic.
The non-dupes: But Lacan's main target, this year, are the non-dupes. They come in a variety of guises and so I will spend a little more time on them. As we have already said their basic phantasy is the age-old belief that life is a journey. This sustains a whole stage of logic from which Lacan is trying to rescue us: All men are mortal (read viators); Socrates is a man; therefore Socrates is mortal. A flawed logic that, in Lacan's view, has been refuted in modern times by the work of Boole, Peirce, Frege, Cantor and others.
But this image of the viator is above all incarnated in the Church, meaning Christianity, and on several occasions Lacan calls on his listeners to take it on in a fight to the death. He even cites Jesus' remarks about 'the lilies in the fields that neither sew nor spin as a denegation of the Freudian notion of the unconscious and therefore to be absolutely rejected by analysts. What it leads to is an embracing of a subtle modality of the death drive that alienates believers from this world and leads an emptying out of what is involved in sexual love by promoting a type of insensibility about what concerns the body.
It is indeed here that there is situated the core of religion in so far as it preaches divine love...This perversion of the Other as such, establishes in the sadistic story of Original Sin, and in everything that follows from it, by having adopted, naturally, this pre- Christian myth, ... establishes in the Imaginary, in this body precisely, this sort of levitation, of insensibility about what concerns it.
At the same time Lacan is obliged to admit that the greatest scientists and mathematicians - Pascal, Newton, Leibniz and Einstein - had 'a cast- absolute belief in religion' and that Einstein's theory of the absolute nature of the speed of light has an uncanny echo of the Fiat lux of Genesis.
There is a paradox here and the best explanation I can see for him urging the firm opposition of psychoanalysts to religion is his fierce determination to maintain the integrity of his work against the religious beliefs of many of his closest associates at that time: Franchise Dolto, Louis Beirnaert, Michel de Certeau and Denis Vasse among others, were devoted followers but prominent Christians in their own right. This seems to have made him see the danger of his teaching being assimilated to theology and religion - a fate against which he felt Freud had not sufficiently guarded with his myths of Oedipus and the primeval totemic father.
Incidentally he took up the same position of opposition to feminist theories being in any way confused with psychoanalysis despite his personal friendship with Helene Cixous, Julia Kristeva and other prominent feminists who followed his seminars and his teaching on sexuation.
'Psychoanalysis is more than psychoanalysis' - one of Jacques-Alain Miller's ways of saying: 'I do not want to be seen as just Lacan's son-in-law' - is not, I think, a motto that he would have taken as his own, despite the support workers from many different fields found in his teaching. Psychoanalysts, as the Proposition of September 1967 makes clear, were to stick to their last - the enormous field of practical and theoretical issues raised by the discovery of the unconscious - and not be led astray by the echoes in his seminars and writings of ancient religious doctrines or contemporary ideological debates.
In fact it was the intensity of this focus that had led the pragmatic Brits sent by the International Psychoanalytic Association to investigate Lacan's orthodoxy to compare his method of commentating on Freud to that of mediaeval - presumably Irish - monks studying the Scriptures. And who needs that in the world of today? It is not hard to imagine the IPA reaction to Charles Merman's congresses at Cordoba, Fez and elsewhere on what we as psychoanalysts can learn from Aquinas, Avicenna and Maimonides!
The IPA and Lacan's excommunication: The other main group of those who do not want to be dupes - the non-dupes who err - are those alluded to in the title of the seminar. This is a play on the title of a seminar that he had begun ten years previously called The name of the Father which was interrupted after the opening session with his excommunication from the International Psychoanalytic Association. In French 'the names of the father' (les noms du pere) and 'the non-dupes err' (les non-dupes errent) sounds exactly the same. His expulsion from the official world-wide body of psychoanalysts with the connivance of favoured pupils like Laplanche and Pontalis was intended to destroy Lacan and reverse the return to Freud that he had put on the top of the agenda of psychoanalysis. It had not been intended to make him into one of the most influential intellectuals in Europe and make the reference to psychoanalysis and Freud obligatory for a whole generation of erstwhile existentialists and Marxists, as well as renewing the practice of a whole swathe of psychiatrists, psychologists and health workers.
Here he is settling old scores with those former students and associates in the IPA who had rejected him and whom he refuses even to acknowledge as analysts. They are philosophers whose aim is to emotionally re-educate their patients so that they can advance from a pre- genital to a genital position. They refuse to stick to the knowledge of the unconscious and have embraced a psychologically informed discourse on the human condition. As regards the formation of psychoanalysts, they have rejected Lacan's fundamental dictum that the psychoanalyst is authorised by him/her self and by some others - the principle of the passe with which he was experimenting at the time - and preferred to proceed by a university cooption process which had already proved (by 1973) to be the death of analysis in English-speaking countries.
The official recognition of someone as an analyst proceeded by way of nomination (nommer-d), which resulted from a foreclosure of the name of the father about which the IPA wanted to hear nothing as evidenced by the excommunication of Lacan at the moment in 1963 when he was beginning to approach the question. A foreclosure deriving from a misconception of transference by seeing it in terms of the expertise of the analyst who knows all about developmental stages and regression while ignoring the key role of the subject-supposed-to-know in mobilising the transference love which alone sustains the subject in the arduous work of his own analysis.
It is curious that in the course of the seminar Lacan scarcely speaks about the Name of the Father and that we have to wait for session ten on March 16th before there is any explicit mention of it. The previous nine sessions are almost entirely taken up with the distinction between the dupes and the non-dupes.
I find that I have spent more time than I intended on the presenting of my own understanding of the teaching of this seminar, so now I would like to return to the other headings I mentioned earlier and say something about them in the form of a collage in which I will try to allow you to get a flavour of the way Lacan himself puts things.
Saying versus what is said
This exposure to his style - even in translation - is important because the distinction between saying (le dire) and what is said (le dit) runs right through the seminar. T o intervene gives rise to the notion of act. It is also essential to think out this notion of act, and to demonstrate how it can come to consist in a saying.'
Lacan tells of someone who came to him because of a fascination with his voice and goes on to reflect on the role it might have in attracting his large, mostly uncomprehending, audience:
It is not a question of timbre. The voice can be strictly the scansion with which I tell you all of that. I am persuaded that there is here a source of your gathering in this enclosure. There is something, like that, that is linked to...to the time that I spend in saying things, since the little o-object is linked to this dimension of time.
There is another aspect of 'saying' that for him is even more important and which he relates to the contingency of love. What draws people to the seminar is that, unlike the university discourse, 'My saying is a happening' and he is obliged to filter what might be a hypnotic effect by introducing logical and mathematical formulae. Let me offer you some quotes:
Not every word is a saying, otherwise, otherwise every word would be a happening (un evenement), which is not the case, otherwise people would not speak about empty words!
A saying is of the order of a happening. It is not a moment of knowing. In a word, it is not philosophy. It is something that is right up with what is going on. Right up with what determines us in so far as it is not quite what people believe. This pedicle of knowledge, short certainly, but always perfectly knotted, which is calledour unconscious.
You are already so groggy from this saying, that I must first of all make a filter, which is a mode of writing specified by mathematics.
Love is the truth, but only in so far as it is starting from it that there begins a different knowledge than propositional knowledge, namely, unconscious knowledge.
Say anything at all, it will always touch the true. Here is the principle of the analytic discourse, and that is, I said somewhere - and to someone who, faith, produced a very nice little book on transference, someone called Michel Neyraut - I told him that by beginning as he did by what he called 'counter-transference', if by this he means the way in which the truth touches the analyst himself, he is surely on the right path, since after all, this is where the true takes on its primary importance.
There are numerous remarks of this kind scattered throughout the seminar and Lacan appears to make no attempt to put them in what would normally be called a logical order. But there is a logic of a different kind at work which is related to the way in which a certain style of saying has its effect both in the analytic session and in the unique way in which the unconscious of each of the listeners is addressed in the public forum of the seminar.
The unconscious and the psychoanalyst
Those who crowd into his seminar are, Lacan surmises, counting on him to find a way out of the stupidity that accompanies those who want to be non-dupes - who err. This demand for enlightenment forms part of the stupidity and he does not attempt to respond to it.
This is what he is trying to counter in the passe in order to see more clearly for himself what it is to devote oneself to listening to the complaints of anyone whatsoever since this is the task of the psychoanalyst. But the response must be directed at unconscious knowledge and the psychoanalytic discourse makes us stick to this knowledge in a way that has no precedent in history. 'What analytic experience testifies for us is that we are dealing, I would say, with untameable truths that we nevertheless have to bear witness to'. And earlier: '...as regards dealing with the unconscious, we are much closer to it by manipulating logic than anything else, because it is of the same order. It is of the order of the written.' It cannot be within everybody's reach to fulfill this office that he defines as gathering up the truth as a complaint - hence the need for the testimony borne by the trainee analyst in the passe.
To give this some clinical relevance I will give a rather long and difficult quote to show the way in which Lacan thinks a psychoanalyst should listen, for example, to the aporias of the anorectic's discourse:
There is a desire to know attributed to the Other. We can see that. It is how there arise, anyway, the manifestations of obligingness that the child gives in his 'whys'. Everything that he poses as a question, in fact, is designed to satisfy what he supposes the Other would want him to ask. This thing attributed to the Other, is very often accompanied by a 'very little for me' (tres peu pour moi). A 'very little for me' of which the child gives proof in this form of which I am sure you have not dreamt, but, as you know, I also learn something every day. I educate myself, I educate myself of course along the line of what I like, along the line of what I invent inevitably, but anyway I do not lack things to feed on. And if you knew as I know, is that not so, the degree to which what I already illustrated about anorexia nervosa by making this action state - because an action states -: T eat nothing'.
But why do I eat nothing? If you ask the anorexics, I for my part have asked it, I have asked it because I was already in my little vein of invention on this subject, I asked it: so then what did they answer me? It is very clear: she was so preoccupied about knowing whether she was eating, that in order to discourage this knowledge, this knowledge like that, the desire to know, is that not so, just for that the kid would have let herself die of hunger!
That is very important This dimension of knowledge is very important, and also to notice that, that it is not desire that presides over knowledge, it is horror.
All of this is very far from being user friendly but it does give an enigmatic glimpse into how an analyst is to adopt the analytic discourse in dealing with the unconscious determinants of life and death symptoms.
Love as contingent
'In the beginning was love' is central to Lacan s seminar on Transference and the starting point for any analytic consideration of love is the phenomenon of transference love. Again a collage of quotes:
Does this mean, does this mean that transference is the entry of the truth? It is the entry of something which is the truth, but the truth of which precisely transference is the discovery, the truth of love.
... love is the truth, but only in so far as it is starting from it ... that there begins a different knowledge than propositional knowledge, namely, unconscious knowledge.
You see, you see, I am flaunting it, huh, that love plagues me. You too, of course. But not like me!
Once again I will not try to present Lacan systematically and simply link up some remarks that struck me and may encourage some of you to tackle the text as our long-suffering Monday evening group did over the last year. The contingency of love is something that Lacan enjoys returning to:
Love refers first of all to the things that happen, let us say, when a man meets a woman. When I say: 'when a man meets a woman', it is because I am modest, I mean by that that I do not claim to go as far as speaking about what happens when a woman meets a man...because my experience is limited, huh.
Along what path does one love a woman...if I ask the question, this is an old Lacanian refrain, it is no doubt because I have the answer. But there are many of them. There is even no question that has more answers. And there is one that I find very good.
How does a man love a woman? By chance. 
This highlighting of love as the lucky chance that brings two speaking beings together runs counter to the Christian teaching of love as being made manifest in the life-long relationship of a loving couple. Because, Lacan re-affirms:
...there is no relationship between the man and the woman, man with a woman is as perplexed about her as a fish with an apple, which normalises our relationships, and which allows me to assimilate them to something of which it would be a lot to say to say that it is love.
Are we going to attribute what is rightly described as the complex relationship between a man and a woman simply to the fact of having made together what I called .. .the journey on this earth, the category, the category, comically, which precisely excludes us from the world...
...love is brought into existence by the impossibility of the sexual bond with the object, And this is what I said in articulating this principle that love is courtly love.
And as regards the age-old wisdom on love:
...wisdom cannot in any way be what results from these considerations on love. Wisdom only exists from elsewhere. For in love it is of no use.
Wisdom can be referred back to the love of the Supreme Being whom the ancients saw all being deriving from. But it is more specifically a Christian phenomenon which put love at the place of desire. Again a long, very allusive quote, taking up and developing some themes of recent seminars such as Encore:
...here we are at the heart of what this love is that I spoke about earlier under the name of divine love.
How did there occur this displacement... which in Christian love situates love at the place ...that seems to me to be that of desire? It was only possible - and that is why I am talking about something about which I have thought a bit, huh, -from what Christ taught. You must not believe that if I said that divine love took the place of desire, that means that it is quite simple for them to be put back in their place, namely, that each should take up its own again. This is not at all what happened. If courtly love was, as I might say, ousted from its place, in order to preside in place of desire at the ascension of a Christian love, that does not mean that desire is exchanged: it was pushed elsewhere. Where desire was chased to, what we have is masochism. Love is the specific imaginary of each one, which unites it to only a certain number of people not at all chosen by chance. You are going to see how, if love becomes really the means by which death is united to enjoyment, the man and the woman, being to knowledge, if it really becomes the means, love no longer defines itself as a failure.
So much for a sampling of what Lacan had to teach us about love in this seminar. It is so confusing and elliptical that one wonders again at the large sophisticated audience that came to hear him. This phenomenon is one that he repeatedly questions himself about, concluding as we said above, that it had something to do with this happening constituted by his 'saying' which seemed to reach the unconscious of each of his listeners.
So, finally, let us turn to some remarks on what he calls 'sexed' rather than 'sexual' identity and in which shows how far he has gone beyond the Oedipal mythology of Freud.
Sexed identity and relationships
Here I will once again offer a number of extracts widely scattered throughout the seminar but which seem to find a common thread in the contrast he draws between the way his formulae of sexuation and traditional propositional logic treat of the sexed identity of men and women. Let us begin with one of his rare little reflections on the everyday experience of how we come up against the uncertainty of this identity. This well pre-dates The Crying Game:
...people try to bring in this something which is supposed to be modelled on logic, and on which there is supposed to be grounded the notion that in the species described as human one is either man or woman. This is very especially what experience rebels against - and I do not need to go far. Someone reported to me, no later than a few hours ago, her encounter with a taxi driver ... about whom not only was it impossible for the -person who was speaking to say whether it was a man or a woman, but that she had even asked and s/he was not able to answer her.
The formulae of sexuation contradict this simplistic either/or, but we know how long Lacan took to formulate them and he is not affirming that the form they have now reached is the final one. However, even in their present state they allow for some new things to be said about the assumption of sexed identity and its surprising analogy with the self- authorisation of the analyst:
These formulae described as quantifiers of sexuation could be expressed differently, and this would perhaps allow progress to be made. It could be put like this: 'the sexed being is only authorised by him/herself. In this sense there is a choice, I mean that what people limit themselves to, in short, by classifying them as male or female does not prevent there being a choice. This is something, of course, that everyone knows. S/he is only authorised by himself - and I would add: 'and by some others'.
What the status of these others is somewhere that must be clearly situated, where my quantifying formulae of sexuation are written. Because I would even say that I am going rather far: if I had not written them, would it not be just as true that the sexed being is only authorised by himself?
This tallies with my saying that the analyst is only authorised by himself? That does not mean he is all alone in deciding it, as I have just pointed out to you, pointed out to you as regards what is involved in the sexed being.
This might be new for the philosophers or theologians or even psychoanalysts who have written about sexual relationships as something that essentially occurs between two clearly differentiated sexes but Lacan goes on:
People had not waited for me to write these formulae for there to be a serious handful of people who are tagged with the label of homosexuality. In fact, it is altogether wrong as a nomination.
The emergence, in this place, and in a way that is all the more problematic in that it is absolutely characteristic of love as homosexual, is a quite striking thing. Man, I write it with a capital M (L'homme), namely, that there is an all-man -for man, love, I mean, what is hooked onto, what is situated in the category of the Imaginary, for man, love goes without saying. Love goes without saying because his enjoyment is enough for him, and that is moreover very exactly why he understands nothing about it.
Again a provocative statement which appears to refer back to his commentary on the Symposium and possibly to the fact that Socrates attributes his knowledge of love to the teaching of Diotima. Love goes without saying for the man:
But for a woman, things must be taken from a different angle, is that not so. If for a man it goes without saying because enjoyment covers everything, including precisely that there is no problem concerning what is involved in love, the enjoyment of the woman - and it is on this that I will end today - the enjoyment of the woman for her part, does not go without saying, namely, without the saying of the truth?
It is with this that I will also end this foray through another obscure but endlessly evocative year of Lacan's teaching and simply add a few words by way of conclusion.
I started today with The Time Traveller's Wife, a good metaphor for the analyst who has to patiently await the return of the analysands from the moments that have formed them in the course of their existence. Is Lacan's 'saying' in this seminar any more than such a metaphor? Life is not a journey, there is no past and present, we have to deal with the sins of our fathers as if they were our own? There is no pardon, there are no excuses. 'Does anyone know a happy marriage?'
As Freud would have it, we must look to the poets and the artists for clues as to what our response might be to the disharmony between our unconscious knowledge and the 'reality' of the world we live in. And the brave attempts of Clare and Henry to sustain their love for one another offers us an imaginative portrayal of how the reality of the dislocation of the sexes can be lived with courage and perseverance even in the face of inexplicable contingencies.
 A. Niffenneger. The Time Traveller's Wife. London, Vintage, 2004.
 J. Lacan. Les non-dupes errent/The Names of the Father. Seminar XXI. 1973-1974. Unpublished. Trans. Cormac Gallagher, 2005. Session of 13th November 1973, pp. 13-14.
 ibid. p. 15.
 ibid. Session of 11 December 1973, p. 5.
 ibid. Session of 21 May1974,p.3.
 ibid. Session of 18 December 1973, p. 12.
 ibid. Session of 21 May1974,p.1.
 ibid. Session of 9 April 1974, p. 16.
 ibid. Session of 18 December 1973, p. 2.
 ibid. Session of 8th January 1974, p. 2.
 ibid. p. 6.
 ibid. Session of 15th January 1974, p. 13.
 ibid. Session of 19th March 1974, p. 6.
 ibid. Sessions of 9 April 1974, p. 8, and 12 February 1974, p. 11.
 ibid. Session of 9 April 1974, p. 19.
 ibid. Session of 19th March 1974, p. 7.
 ibid. Session of 15th January 1974, pp. 13-14.
 ibid. Session of 18th December 1973, p. 4.
 ibid. pp. 5-6.
 ibid. Session of 18th December 1973, p. 5.
 ibid. Session of 8th January 1974, p. 4.
 ibid p. 5.
 ibid. Session of 18th December 1973, pp. 14-15.
 ibid. pp. 15-16.
 ibid. Session of 12 February 1974, p. 10.
 ibid. Session of 9th April 1974, p. 3.
 ibid. Session of 12th February 1974, p. 20.
 ibid. pp. 20-21.