Chapter 2: The Impossibility of the Psychoanalytic Discourse The Psychoanalytic Discourse.
The Letter, Issue 58, Spring 2015, Pages 1 - 30
THE PSYCHOANALYTIC DISCOURSE. A SECOND READING OF LACAN’S L’ÉTOURDIT
Christian Fierens
C. Fierens, Le discours psychanalytique. Une deuxième lecture de L’Étourdit de Lacan. Toulouse, Point hors ligne, Erès, 2012. Trans. C. Gallagher 2014.
TABLE OF CONTENTS[1]
Presentation Introduction: The differance
1. THE ROLES OF THE ANALYST The analyst who knows. The dogmatic analyst The analyst who does not know. The sceptical analyst The analyst who tracks stating. The dynamic analyst The analyst who says what there is. The analyst as witness
2. THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE PSYCHOANALYTIC DISCOURSE...4 Without resources With resilience ‘There is no sexual relationship’ or the development of the matheme of the impossible
The undecidable Conclusion
3. THE LOGICS OF SEXUATION
The ‘masculine phallic formulae’
The question of the subject The impasse The ‘feminine phallic formulae’
4. THE STUFF OF THE PSYCHOANALYTIC DISCOURSE AND ITS CUT
The philosophical discourse and the psychoanalytic discourse: the same stuff The cut-the stitch, the effacing of the psychoanalytic discourse
The novelty of the psychoanalytic discourse
Saying privileged in the psychoanalytic discourse
5. THE SENSE OF THE PSYCHOANALYTIC DISCOURSE
The comfort and the impossibility of the psychoanalytic group
The rejected psychoanalyst The directive idea of the psychoanalytic discourse The psychoanalytic discourse as compared to the other discourses
6. THE STRUCTURE OF THE PSYCHOANALYTIC DISCOURSE,
IS INTERPRETATION Between meaning and absence, the flickering of sense Structure The equivocation of interpretation The three kernel-points of equivocation and the psychoanalytic discourse as Borromean
PERSPECTIVES FOR THE PSYCHOANALYTIC DISCOURSE BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES
CHAPTER 2
THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE
PSYCHOANALYTIC DISCOURSE
Over against the approach of witnessing which transforms the supposedly established act of saying into the statement of a said and heard, it will be a matter of starting from the said to rediscover a saying which on the one hand is forgotten and which on the other hand cannot be expressed in the form of a said. The task seems hopeless: we have saying and the said–heard (ditentendu) in their opposition, the first is completely forgotten, we can only start from the second and, what is more, we cannot exhibit saying in terms of saids, or again in terms of truth, since the truth is always of the domain of the said, more precisely of the half-said. In truth there is no saying.
Nevertheless it is indeed by restoring its saying that the discourse of analysis would be constituted (AE [Autres Ecrits], p. 454). Not the discourse of the analyst: starting from the personage of the analyst, it is rather the established discourses which take on the consistency of saids. But the discourse of analysis starts from the neutral speech which does not allow itself to be determined either by a precise stating subject, nor by a fixed object of which one might speak. Saying without saying who and without saying what. Neutrality is a fundamental principle.
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